Abstract-This paper presents a fully secure (adaptive-predicate unforgeable and private) attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme in the standard model. The security of the proposed ABS scheme is proven under standard assumptions, the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption and the existence of collision resistant (CR) hash functions. The admissible predicates of the proposed ABS scheme are more general than those of the existing ABS schemes, i.e., the proposed ABS scheme is the first to support general non-monotone predicates, which can be expressed using NOT gates as well as AND, OR, and Threshold gates, while the existing ABS schemes only support monotone predicates. The proposed ABS scheme is comparably as efficient as (several times worse than) one of the most efficient ABS schemes, which is proven to be secure in the generic group model.
valid signature for a pair comprising predicate and message ðv v; mÞ, even if the adversary adaptively chooses ðv v; mÞ after executing secret-key and signing oracle attacks, provided that x x where v vðx xÞ holds is not queried to the secret-key oracle and ðv v; mÞ is not queried to the signing oracle (We simply call this unforgeability "adaptive-predicate unforgeability" or more simply "unforgeability").
We can also define a weaker class of unforgeability, 'selective-predicate unforgeability,' where an adversary should choose predicate v v for the forgery signature before executing secret-key and signing oracle attacks. Privacy. A signature for predicate v v generated using secret key sk x x releases no information regarding attribute x x except that v vðx xÞ holds. More formally, for any pair of attributes ðx x 1 ; x x 2 Þ, predicate v v and message m, for which v vðx x 1 Þ and v vðx x 2 Þ hold simultaneously, the distributions of two valid signatures sðm; v v; sk x x 1 Þ and sðm; v v; sk x x 2 Þ are equivalent, where sðm; v v; sk x x Þ is a correctly generated signature for ðm; v vÞ using correct secret key sk x x with attribute x x (We simply call this condition "privacy"). Full Security. We say that an ABS scheme is fully secure if it satisfies adaptive-predicate unforgeability and privacy. Maji et al. [8] , [9] presented ABS schemes for the widest class of predicates among the existing ABS schemes, monotone access structure predicates, which cover threshold predicates as special cases. The scheme shown in [8] is an efficient and practical ABS scheme, but the security was only proven in the generic group model. The schemes in [9] and by Escala et al. [12] are the only existing ABS schemes that were proven to be fully secure in the standard model. They are, however, much less efficient and more complicated than the scheme in [8] since it employs the GrothSahai NIZK protocols [13] as building blocks.
Herranz et al. [14] , Li et al. [6] , Li and Kim [7] , and Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini [10] presented ABS schemes that are proven to be secure in the standard model. However, the proven security is not the full security, but a weaker level of security with selective-predicate unforgeability. Moreover, the admissible predicates in [7] are limited to conjunction or ðn; nÞ-threshold predicates, and those of [6] , [10] are limited to ðk; nÞ-threshold predicates. Guo and Zeng [3] and Yang et al. [11] presented ABS schemes for threshold predicates, but their security definitions do not include the privacy condition of ABS.
Khader [4] , [5] presented ABS schemes for monotone access structure predicates. These schemes, however, do not satisfy the privacy condition of ABS, since they only conceal the identity of the signer. They also reveal the attributes that the signer used to generate the signature. In addition, the security is proven in a non-standard model, the random oracle model.
Based on this background, there are two major problems in the existing ABS schemes.
1) No ABS scheme for non-monotone predicates, which can be expressed using NOT gates as well as AND, OR and Threshold gates, has been proposed (even in a weaker security notion or a non-standard model).
2) The only fully secure ABS schemes in the standard model [9] , [12] are much less efficient than the ABS scheme in the generic group model [8] . Non-monotone predicates should be used in many ABS applications. For example, annual review reports in the Mathematics Department of University A are submitted by reviewers, and these reports are anonymously signed by the reviewers through ABS with some predicates. The predicates may be selected freely by them (signers) except that it should be in the following form: NOT((Institute = Univ. A) AND (Department = Mathematics)) AND (Á Á Á).
Our Results
This paper addresses these problems simultaneously.
This paper proposes the first fully secure (i.e., adaptive-predicate unforgeable and perfectly private) ABS scheme for a wide class of predicates, non-monotone access structures, where x x for signing key sk x x is a tuple of attributes ðx 1 ; . . . ; x i Þ, non-monotone predicate v v is specified by a span program (SP) ðM; rÞ along with a tuple of attributes ðv 1 ; . . . ; v j Þ, and v vðx xÞ holds iff SP ðM; rÞ accepts the truth-value vector of ðTðx i 1 ¼ v 1 Þ; . . . ; Tðx i j ¼ v j ÞÞ. Here, TðcÞ :¼ 1 if c is true, and TðcÞ :¼ 0 if c is false.
Our scheme can be generalized using non-monotone access structures combined with inner-product relations (see Definition 5 and the remark). More precisely, attribute x x for signing key sk x x is a tuple of attribute vectors (e.g., ðx 1 ; . . . ;x i Þ 2 F n 1 þÁÁÁþn i q ), and predicate v v for verification is a non-monotone access structure or span program ðM; rÞ along with a tuple of attribute vectors (e.g., ðṽ 1 ; . . . ;ṽ j Þ 2 F n 1 þÁÁÁþn j q ), where the component-wise inner-product relations for attribute vectors (e.g., fx ii Áṽ i ¼ 0 or not g i2f1;...;jg ) are input to SP ðM; rÞ. Namely, v vðx xÞ holds iff the truth-value vector of ðTðx i 1 Áṽ 1 ¼ 0Þ; . . . ; Tðx i j Áṽ j ¼ 0ÞÞ is accepted by SP ðM; rÞ. Remark 1. In our scheme (Section 4), attribute x x is expressed by the form G :¼ fðt; x t Þ j t 2 T f1; . . . ; dgg in place of just an attribute tuple ðx 1 ; . . . ; x i Þ, where t identifies a sub-universe or category of attributes, and x t is an attribute in sub-universe t (examples of ðt; x t Þ are (Name, Alice) and (Age, 38)). Predicate v v is expressed by S :¼ ðM; rÞ, where r is abused as r (defined by SP) combined with fðt i ; v i Þ j i ¼ 1; . . . ; 'g (see Definitions 4 and 5 for the difference regarding r in SP and S). The proposed ABS scheme is proven to be fully secure under standard assumptions, the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption (over prime order pairing groups) and the existence of collision resistant (CR) hash functions, in the standard model. In contrast to the ABS schemes in [9] , [12] that employ the Groth-Sahai NIZK protocols, our ABS scheme is more directly constructed without using any general subprotocols like NIZK. Our construction is based on the dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) proposed by Okamoto and Takashima [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , which can be realized from any type of (e.g., symmetric or asymmetric) prime order bilinear pairing groups. See Section 2.1 for the concept and actual construction of DPVS. The efficiency of the proposed ABS scheme is comparable to that of the most efficient ABS scheme in the generic group model [8] , and better than those of the existing fully secure ABS schemes in the standard model [9] , [12] . See Section 4.4 for a comparison. This paper also presents an extension, multi-authority (MA) setting, of the proposed ABS scheme (See the full version [19] ). One of the merits of our MA-ABS scheme is that it is seamlessly extended from the original (single-authority (SA)) setting, in which the signing and verification algorithms of the MA-ABS scheme are essentially the same as those of the original ABS (SA-ABS) scheme.
In MA-ABS, each authority called an attribute authority is responsible for a single (or multiple) category of attributes, and a user obtains a part of secret key for each attribute from an attribute authority responsible for the category of the attribute. In our MA-ABS model, a central trustee in addition to attribute authorities is required but no interaction among attribute authorities (and the trustee) is necessary, and different attribute authorities may not trust each other, nor even be aware of each other.
We prove that the proposed MA-ABS scheme is fully secure under the DLIN assumption and CR hash functions in the standard model (see the full version [19] for the scheme). Our MA-ABS scheme is almost as efficient as the original SA-ABS scheme.
Key Techniques
The top level strategy of constructing the proposed ABS scheme is based on Naor's paradigm of converting IBE to signatures. Our ABS scheme is converted from a ciphertext policy (CP) functional encryption (FE) scheme [18] , which is adaptively payload-hiding. The description of the CP-FE scheme is given in the full version of [18] .
Roughly speaking, in the conversion, a secret signing key, sk G , with attribute set G and a verification text,c c, with access structure S (for signature verification) in our ABS scheme correspond to a secret decryption key, sk G , with G and a ciphertext,c c, with S in the CP-FE scheme, respectively.
Our construction, however, is not straightforward, or still a challenging task, since no counterpart of a signature,s s Ã , in the ABS exists in the CP-FE, and the privacy property for signatures s Ã is specific in ABS. To tackle the issue, we develop a new technique, re-randomization with specialized delegation, where signatures s Ã in ABS can be interpreted to be a decryption key specialized to decrypt a ciphertext with access structure S, that is delegated and re-randomized from secret key sk G .
As for the security proof, roughly speaking, the adaptivepredicate unforgeability of the ABS under the KeyGen oracle attacks can be guaranteed by the non-adaptive payloadhiding security of the CP-FE. 1 This is because, in the security game, a forged signature implies a decryption key specified for the challenge ciphertext to break the payloadhiding, and all secret key and signing queries are made by an adversary before giving a forged signature in the adaptive-predicate unforgeability of ABS, where all secret key queries are made by an adversary before requesting a challenge ciphertext in the non-adaptive payload-hiding of FE. Note that there are many subtleties in the proof of unforgeability for the ABS, e.g., the unforgeability should be ensured in the ABS even when publishing f b B Ã t g t¼1;...;dþ1 for the privacy requirement, while they are secret in the CP-FE. We develop a novel technique to resolve the difficulty. See Section 5.3 for more details.
We now describe a new key technique in this paper, which was not employed in the preliminary version [1] of this paper.
A key technique of proving the (non-)adaptive payloadhiding security of the CP-FE scheme [18] is pairwise independence lemma (Lemma 3 in [18] ) in the dual system encryption methodology. A drawback of this technique is that it is directly applicable only when there is a one-to-one correspondence (so-called "one-use") between a pair of secret key and ciphertext parts through a map r of policy (access structures S), but in general a ciphertext part corresponds to multiple secret key parts (so-called "multi-use"). Okamoto and Takashima [18] introduced a technique to treat such a multi-use case by using a generalized pairwise independence lemma, but it costs longer secret keys and ciphertexts than those in one-use, and the public parameter bounds the maximum degree of multi-use. The security (unforgeability) proof of the preliminary version [1] is based on the (generalized) pairwise independence lemma technique and inherits the drawback of this technique. In this paper, to address the issue we introduce a new technique, one-dimensional localization of inner-product values, where an unbounded (by the public parameter) number of inner-product values in multiuse are localized into a certain one-dimensional subspace and the other subspaces include no information of the inner-product values, while no information but only a single inner-product value is ensured to be released for a pair of corresponding secret key and ciphertext subspaces in one-use by the pairwise independence lemma. Note that this technique is available for proving the adaptive-predicate unforgeability of the ABS and the non-adaptive payload-hiding security of the CP-FE (but not for the adaptive payload-hiding security of the CP-FE). For more details, see Section 5.3.
Related Works
Ring and mesh signatures. Ring and mesh signatures [21] , [22] are related to ABS.
In the ring signatures, the claimed predicate on a signature of message m is that m is endorsed by one of the users identified by the list of public keys ðpk 1 ; pk 2 ; . . .Þ, or the predicate is a disjunction of a list of public keys. A valid ring signature can be generated by one of the listed users.
The mesh signatures are an extension of ring signatures, where the predicate is an access structure on a list of pairs comprising a message and public key ðm i ; pk i Þ, and a valid mesh signature can be generated by a person who has enough standard signatures s i on m i , each valid under pk i , to satisfy the given access structure.
A crucial difference between mesh signatures and ABS is the security against the collusion of users. In mesh signatures, several users can collude by pooling their signatures together and create signatures that none of them could produce individually. That is, such collusion is considered to be legitimate in mesh signatures. In contrast, the security against collusion attacks is one of the basic requirements in ABS and MA-ABS, as described in Section 1.1. Anonymous credentials (ACs). Another related concept is ACs [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] . The notion of ACs also provides a functionality for users to demonstrate anonymously possession of attributes, but the goals of ACs and ABS differ in several points.
As mentioned in [9] , ACs and ABS aim at different goals: ACs target very strong anonymity even in the registration phase, whereas under less demanding anonymity requirements in the registration phase, ABS aims to achieve more expressive functionalities, more efficient constructions and new applications. In addition, ABS is a signature scheme and a simpler primitive compared with ACs.
Notations
When A is a random variable or distribution, y R A denotes that y is randomly selected from A according to its distribution. When A is a set, y U A denotes that y is uniformly selected from A. y :¼ z denotes that y is set, defined or substituted by z. When a is a fixed value, AðxÞ ! a (e.g., AðxÞ ! 1) denotes the event that machine (algorithm) A outputs a on input x. A function f: N ! R is negligible in , if for every constant c > 0, there exists an integer n such that fðÞ < Àc for all > n. We denote the finite field of order q by F q , and F q n f0g by F Â q . A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over F q , e.g.,x denotes ðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ 2 F n q . For two vectors x ¼ ðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ andṽ ¼ ðv 1 ; . . . ; v n Þ,x Áṽ denotes the innerproduct P n i¼1 x i v i . The vector0 is abused as the zero vector in F n q for any n. X T denotes the transpose of matrix X. A bold face letter denotes an element of vector space V, e.g., 
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Dual Pairing Vector Spaces by Direct Product of Symmetric Pairing Groups
In this paper, for simplicity of description, we will present the proposed schemes on the symmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces [15] , [16] constructed using symmetric bilinear pairing groups given in Definition 1. Owing to the abstraction of DPVS, the presentation and the security proof of the proposed schemes are essentially the same as those on the asymmetric version of DPVS, ðq; V; V Ã ; G T ; A; A Ã ; eÞ, for which see the full version of [18] . The symmetric version is a specific (self-dual) case of the asymmetric version, where
Definition 1. "Symmetric bilinear pairing groups" ðq; G; G T ; G; eÞ are a tuple of a prime q, cyclic additive group G and multiplicative group G T of order q, G 6 ¼ 0 2 G, and a polynomialtime computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing e : G Â G ! G T i.e., eðsG; tGÞ ¼ eðG; GÞ st and eðG; GÞ 6 ¼ 1. Let G bpg be an algorithm that takes input 1 and outputs a description of bilinear pairing groups ðq; G; G T ; G; eÞ with security parameter . Definition 2. "Dual pairing vector spaces" ðq; V; G T ; A; eÞ by a direct product of symmetric pairing groups ðq; G; G T ; G; eÞ are a tuple of prime q, N-dimensional vector space 
by a natural multiplication of a N-dim. row vector and a N Â N matrix. Thus it holds an associative law as ðg gW ÞW À1 ¼ g gðWW À1 Þ ¼ g g and a pairing invariance property eðg gW; h hðW À1 Þ T Þ ¼ eðg g; h hÞ for any g g; h h 2 V.
Decisional Linear Assumption
Definition 3 (DLIN assumption). The DLIN problem is to guess b 2 f0; 1g, given ðparam G ; G; G; kG; dG; skG; A span program is called monotone if the labels of the rows are only the positive literals fp 1 ; . . . ; p n g. Monotone span programs compute monotone functions. (So, a span program in general is "non"-monotone. ) We assume that no row M i (i ¼ 1; . . . ; ') of the matrix M is 0. We now introduce a non-monotone access structure with evaluating map g by using the inner-product of attribute vectors in a general form. Although we will show the notion, security definition and security proof of the proposed ABS scheme in this general form, we will describe the proposed ABS scheme in a simpler form in Section 4.2. We will show this simpler form of Definition 5 in the remark. Remark 3. When a user has multiple attributes in a sub-universe (category) t, we can employ dimension n t > 2. For instance, a professor (say Alice) in the science faculty of a university is also a professor in the engineering faculty of this university. If the attribute authority of this university manages sub-universe t :¼ "faculties of this university", Alice obtains a secret key for ðt;x t :¼ ð1; Àða þ bÞ; abÞ 2 F q 3 Þ with a :¼ "science" and b :¼ "engineering" from the authority. When a user verifies a signature for an access structure with a single negative attribute :ðt, "science"), the verification text is encoded as :ðt;ṽ i :¼ ða 2 ; a; 1ÞÞ with a :¼ "science". Sincex t Áṽ i ¼ 0, Alice cannot make a valid signature for an access structure with the negative attribute :ðt, "science"). For such a case with n t > 2, see Section 5 with a general form of our ABS scheme.
We now construct a secret-sharing scheme for a (nonmonotone) access structure (span program).
Definition 6. A secret-sharing scheme for access structure S :¼ ðM; rÞ is: Since the correct distribution on signatures can be perfectly simulated without depending on any specific private information, signatures must not leak any such private information of the signer.
Definition 9 (Unforgeability). For an adversary, A, we define Adv ABS;UF A ðÞ to be the success probability in the following experiment for any security parameter . An ABS scheme is existentially unforgeable if the success probability of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible: 1) Run ðsk; pkÞ R Setupð1 ;ñÞ and give pk to the adversary. 2) A may adaptively makes a polynomial number of queries of the following type:
[Create key] A asks the challenger to create a signing key for an attribute set G. The challenger creates a key for G without giving it to A.
[Create signature] A specifies a key for predicate G that has already been created, and asks the challenger to perform a signing operation to create a signature for a message m and an access structure S that accepts G. The challenger computes the signature without giving it to the adversary.
[Reveal key or signature] A asks the challenger to reveal an already-created key for an attribute set G, or an already-created signature for an access structure S. Note that when key or signature creation requests are made, A does not automatically see the created key or signature. A sees it only when it makes a reveal query.
3) At the end, the adversary outputs ðm 0 ; S 0 ; s 0 Þ. We say the adversary succeeds if a correctly-created signature for ðm 0 ; S 0 Þ was never revealed to the adversary, S 0 does not accept any G queried to the create key and reveal (key) oracles, and Verðpk; m 0 ; S 0 ; s 0 Þ ¼ 1.
Remark 4. Since a signing query in the unforgeability definition in [1] , [9] is made only with an access structure S, the challenger should find an attribute set G that satisfies S, and generate a key sk G with G and a signature with S using ðG; sk G Þ. In general, however, the challenger may not always find a suitable G from S in a polynomial time since it includes the problem of solving the satisfiability for any DNF and CNF formulas with polynomial sizes. In this sense, the definition of unforgeability in [1] , [9] is problematic.
To address this issue, our definition of unforgeability introduces four types of queries, create and reveal queries for keys and signatures, in a manner similar to the security definition for key-delegation by Shi and Waters [30] . Here, to obtain a signature for S from the challenger, the adversary is required to give an attribute set G that satisfies S to the challenger in advance (i.e., the challenger has no need to find a suitable G by itself.) 4 PROPOSED ABS SCHEME
Construction Ideas
As mentioned in Section 1.3, our ABS scheme is constructed on a ciphertext policy functional encryption scheme [18] . Therefore, the algorithms of the proposed ABS scheme can be described in the light of such correspondence to the CP-FE scheme Setup Almost the same as that in the CP-FE scheme except that f b B Ã t g t¼1;...;dþ1 are revealed as a public parameter in our ABS, while they are secret in the CP-FE scheme. They are published in our ABS for the signature generation procedure Sig to meet the privacy of signers (for randomization). This implies an important gap between CP-FE and ABS. KeyGen Almost the same as that in the CP-FE scheme except that a (7 dimensional) space with basis B Ã dþ1 is additionally introduced in our ABS and two elements k k Ã dþ1;1 and k k Ã dþ1;2 in this space are included in a secret signing key in order to embed the hash value, H 
Construction
For simplicity, here, we describe our ABS scheme for a specific parameterñ :¼ ðd; 2; . . . ; 2Þ (see the remark of Definition 5). A general form of our ABS scheme is given in Section 5.
Setupð1
;ñ :¼ ðd; 2; . . . ; 2ÞÞ : such that P i2I a i M i ¼1; and 
where y i U F q nfv i g;
if i 6 2 I^rðiÞ ¼ :ðt; v i Þ;
where r r [Correctness] Q 'þ1 i¼0 eðc c i ; s s
Security
Theorem 1. The proposed ABS scheme is perfectly private.
Theorem 2. The proposed ABS scheme is unforgeable (adaptivepredicate unforgeable) under the DLIN assumption and the existence of collision resistant hash functions.
For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 ; E 2 ; E 3À1 ; . . . ; E 3À4 ; E 5 ; E 6 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter , Adv ABS;UF A ðÞ Adv
þ ; where E 3-h-i ðÁÞ :¼ E 3-i ðh; ÁÞ for h ¼ 1; . . . ; n 1 ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; 4, E i-h ðÁÞ :¼ E i ðh; ÁÞ for i ¼ 5; 6; h ¼ 1; . . . ; n 2 , n 1 is the maximum number of A's reveal key queries, n 2 is the maximum number of A's reveal signature queries, and :
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 (for a general form of our ABS) are given in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.
Performance
In this section, we compare the efficiency and security of the proposed ABS scheme with the existing ABS schemes in the standard model (two typical instantiations) [9] as well as the ABS scheme in the generic group model [8] (as a benchmark). Since all of these schemes can be implemented over a prime order pairing group, the size of a group element can be around the size of F q (e.g., 256 bits). In Table 1 , ' and r represent the size of the underlying access structure matrix M for a predicate, i.e., M 2 F 'Âr q . For example, some predicate with 4 AND and 5 OR gates as well as 10 variables may be expressed by a 10 Â 5 matrix, and a predicate with 49 AND and 50 OR gates as well as 100 variables may be expressed by a 100 Â 50 matrix (see the appendix of [31] ). is the security parameter (e.g., 128).
GENERAL FORM OF THE PROPOSED ABS SCHEME
This section provides a general form description of the proposed ABS scheme, while Section 4 describes a simpler form of the ABS scheme. The security proof of the proposed ABS scheme will be given for the general form of the ABS scheme.
Construction
In the description of the scheme, we assume that an input vector,x t :¼ ðx t;1 ; . . . ; x t;n t Þ, is normalized such that x t;1 :¼ 1.
(Ifx t is not normalized, change it to a normalized one by ð1=x t;1 Þ Áx t , assuming that x t;1 is non-zero). In addition, we assume that input vectorṽ i :¼ ðv i;1 ; . . . ; v i;n t Þ satisfies that v i;n t 6 ¼ 0. We refer to Section 1.5 for notations on DPVS.
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed ABS scheme.
param V t :¼ ðq; V t ; G T ; A t ; eÞ :¼ G dpvs ð1 ; N t ; param G Þ; 
where r r 
if i 2 I^rðiÞ ¼ :ðt;ṽ i Þ;
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1 Theorem 1. The proposed (general form) ABS scheme is perfectly private.
Proof. Before starting the proof, we first define function AltSig specified in the proposed ABS scheme as follows:
AltSigðpk; sk; m; SÞ: 
For any fa 0 i g such that
are equivalent. Therefore, distributions Sigðpk; sk G ; m; SÞ and AltSigðpk; sk; m; SÞ are equivalent.
Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 (for General Form ABS). . . . ; n 2 , n 1 is the maximum number of A's reveal key queries, n 2 is the maximum number of A's reveal signature queries, and :¼ ðð2d þ 22Þn 1 þ 8n 2 þ 2d þ 15Þ=q.
Key Techniques
In the security proof of ABS, we use several key ingredients for removing the limitation for multi-use: special matrix transformation, unbounded randomness injection, and onedimensional localization of inner-product values. Letṽ . While the rest of the first n t coordinate values of fṽ 0 i Á Ug i¼1;2;:: have additional information, we can computationally change these values to uniformly random since the corresponding n t coordinate values ofx 0 Á Z are zero, i.e.,x 0 Á Z ¼ ð0; . . . ; 0; 1Þ. The special matrix transformation and the unbounded randomness injection technique achieve one-dimensional localization of innerproduct values in the last one-dimensional subspace without leaking any additional information. While the special matrix Z t such thatx 0 t Á Z t ¼ ð0; . . . ; 0; 1Þ should be used instead of random Z t , these matrices are determined when the target key query is issued.
Games 3-h-2 and 3-h-3 (h ¼ 1; . . . ; n 1 ) in the proof below reflect the above techniques.
In Fig. 1 , an equality between neighboring games indicates that the left-hand game can be conceptually (information-theoretically) changed to the right-hand game. An approximate equality between them indicates that the gap between them is upper-bounded by the advantage of the problem indicated, where Problems 1-3 and reductions to them and DLIN are given in the full version [19] .
Main Part of the Proof
Proof. To prove Theorem 2, we consider the following ð7n 1 þ n 2 þ 6Þ games. In Game 0', a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game. Game 0: Original game (Definition 9). Game 0': Game 0' is the same as Game 0 except the following procedures. 1) When a create key query is issued by A, challenger C only records the specified attributes, and when a create signature query is issued, C only records the specified attributes (for key) and access structure. In this step, C just records, but creates no corresponding keys or signatures. 2) When a reveal key query is issued for attributes G which has been already recorded, C creates the queried key by using KeyGenðpk; sk; GÞ. And, when a reveal signature query is issued for (attributes G and) access structure S which has been already recorded with G satisfying S, C creates the queried signature by using AltSigðpk; sk; m; SÞ in the proof of Theorem 1. That is, the reply to a KeyGen reveal query for G :¼ fðt;x t Þg are k k 
